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Discussion of shareholder voting frequently begins against a
background of the democratic expectations and justifications present
in decisionmaking in the public sphere. Directors are assumed to be
agents of the shareholders in much the same way that public officers
are representatives of citizens. Recent debates about majority voting
and shareholder nomination of directors illustrate this pattern.
Yet the corporate process differs in significant ways, partly because
the market for shares permits a form of intensity voting and lets
markets mediate the outcome in a way that would be foreign to the
public setting and partly because the shareholders' role is more
limited than that of citizens in the political process. The most
developed theory of corporate voting, Easterbrook and Fischel's
economic based theory from the 1980s, describes shareholder voting
as the best means to fill gaps in incomplete contracts; shareholders
as the residual owners have the best economic incentives to exercise
such discretion. Such a theory supports unfettered shareholder
action substantially broader than what actually exists.
In this Article, we set out a new theory for shareholder voting
based on information theory and more particularly voting as
a method of error correction. Like the prior theory, our approach
explains why, among various corporate constituencies,
only shareholders may vote. More importantly, our theory provides a
more consistent theoretical foundation for explaining the few issues
on which shareholders actually do vote. We use this approach to
address the recent development of empty voting, a process where
investors have used innovations in finance such as derivatives,
equity swaps, and share lending, to obtain voting rights in a
corporation stripped of any financial interest in the company.
The error-correction purpose of corporate voting requires that there
be alignment between the voting right and the underlying financial
interest of shares as has been illustrated in the traditional corporate
law practices of one share/one vote and bans on vote buying and
contracts that separate voting rights and financial interests.
We propose that courts reinvigorate these principles to police empty
voting. Our theory also provides a superior framework in which to
assess proposals for increased shareholder power in corporate
governance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What are we to make of shareholder voting? Delaware law
presents voting as the ideological underpinning of a corporate
governance system that gives directors wide control over other
people's money.1 In the legal commentary, there are recurring
descriptions of corporations as representative democracies in which
New York Alumni Chancellor's Chair in Law & Professor of Management, Vanderbilt
University.
.. Professor of Mathematics and Law, Vanderbilt University. We have benefited from the
comments of Jeff Gordon, Sam Issacharoff, Curtis Milhaupt, Larry Ribstein, Lynn Stout, and
participants at workshops at New York University, the University of Connecticut, and Emory
University, colloquia at Columbia University, Fordham University, the University of Illinois, and
the University of Iowa, and the Conference on Shareholder Roles, Shareholder Voting and
Corporate Performance at the University of Cagliari.
1. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("The shareholder
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.");
see also MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (noting that Delaware
courts "have remained assiduous in carefully reviewing any board actions designed to interfere
with or impede the effective exercise of corporate democracy by shareholders, especially in the
election of directors").
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members act through their representatives, 2 reinforcing a legitimacy
role for corporate voting allied to political theory. Yet there is reason
to wonder if corporate voting requires such a broad foundation. Voting
plays a limited role in corporate decisionmaking, much more limited
than in the public sphere. Shareholders have binding votes on only
two things: the election of directors and ratifying fundamental
corporate changes such as mergers. Even in those two areas,
legislatures and courts have permitted substantial limits on the
exercise of the shareholder franchise. Shareholders seldom seem to
care much about the vote even when they have it, usually preferring
the "Wall Street rule" (i.e., sell) when they disagree with a decision
made by the corporation's managers.
This reality should push any discussion of corporate voting
away from a focus on democratic theory and legitimacy, which would
imply voting is a way to aggregate the preferences of the rightful
claimants as to who should run a corporation (or the country), and
more toward a framework based on information theory, which treats
voting as a means of error correction for decisions. The mere existence
of markets for shares drives much of this movement. A corporate voter
who has intense feelings about the matter to be determined can
influence, if not control, the outcome by purchasing shares. Even our
richest presidential candidates cannot directly buy such power over
the electorate. Our corporate law is not troubled that shares are
purchased in the heat of a corporate election campaign; indeed this
structure assumes that even non-selling voters will decide not to sell
largely on the basis of price information provided by the market.
Voting, when it does occur, is embedded in an intentional governance
structure that usually trusts directors to make corporate decisions,
subject to a bevy of interlocking constraints. Voting is saved for those
few contexts that are so fraught with potential for insider conflict that
a check by shareholders is needed. Our theory, therefore, does not
start with shareholders as plenary owners or decisionmakers, but
rather seeks to more precisely calibrate where shareholder voting
improves the decisionmaking process.
2. Scholars differ on where a framework of representative democracy might lead. Compare
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L. REV. 833, 837
(2005) (arguing for shareholder power not only to elect and replace directors but also to initiate
and adopt rules-of-the-game decisions), with Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and
Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 28 (2002) (arguing that
representative democracy is part of the "deep design" of Delaware corporate form and that the
shareholder choice provided is "the right to choose representatives periodically, not the right of
perpetual self-governance through instant polls or plebiscites").
[Vol. 62:1:129
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If it is permissible to buy shares, why isn't it also permissible
to buy votes, separate from shares, as yet another market-based
mechanism to reflect parties' intensities of views and to permit them
to place funds behind those intensities? Longstanding legal
prohibitions against vote buying for corporate shares have withered in
recent decades, and courts have struggled to define a consistent theory
supporting such a ban. Our approach suggests that there remains a
need for a legal prohibition on vote buying, albeit one that does not
look exactly the same as the traditional remedy of that name. For
shareholder voting to play its assigned governance role as a check on
directors in particular settings, voting must be linked to the
underlying financial ownership rights of shares. This ensures that the
voters' interests align with the collective interest. Financial
innovation in securities markets has now made it much easier to
separate voting interests from the economic rights accruing to shares
through derivatives, swaps, and other complex instruments and
transactions. The practical result has been to break the connection
between voting and collective welfare on which the use of voting in
traditional governance structure rests. This is highlighted in recent
"empty voting" episodes: investors have retained voting rights without
the financial risk attendant to the shares, allowing them to influence a
particular vote to the possible detriment of the corporation as a
whole.3 The legal structure has not yet caught up to these financial
developments.
In this Article, we seek to provide a current view of the place of
shareholder voting in corporate law. We begin with a brief discussion
of the purposes that voting serves generally and the requirements that
might follow from such specifications. Second, we identify how voting
is different in a corporate setting. In subsequent discussion, we set out
a general theory of shareholder voting that differs from the
contractarian or anti-managerialist proposals that have dominated
prior discussions. We conclude that voting retains an important, albeit
limited, role in corporate governance; that shareholder voting is not
plenary but targeted; and, that for voting to play this role there must
be alignment between the interest of those who are given the vote and
3. This is discussed in more detail in Part V. See generally Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L.
REV. 811 (2006) (analyzing the incentives created when companies own disproportionate shares
of voting rights to economic interests and proposing a mandatory disclosure requirement to
correct the negative effects); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007) (discussing the possibility that hedge
funds owning corporate shares and voting rights may maximize short-term profits at the expense
of the corporation's long-term vitality).
20091
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the collective interest of shareholders. We discuss how financial
innovation has decoupled that relationship but in a way that is
different from the voting trusts and vote buying contexts addressed by
earlier case law. We then suggest how the law can evolve to
discourage such behavior.
This theory also suggests the items for which shareholder
voting is most needed: replacing entrenched directors who are
blocking a value-increasing transaction and blocking an empire-
building merger proposed by directors and managers. As a descriptive
matter, most voting follows these specifications. As a normative
matter, we suggest instances as to when voting should expand
(blocking poison pills) and where it is less necessary (shareholder
nominations for directors).
II. PURPOSES OF VOTING
Voting can play a variety of different roles. At its most basic
level, voting is a means to aggregate the preferences of a group when
there is not necessarily a right or wrong answer. It is a way for a
group with a multitude of opinions to decide on one. In a universe
where there is no perfect method to aggregate individual preferences
into a social preference, 4 voting remains a very common way of
making decisions in a group. A pure democracy, such as a New
England town meeting, is a classic example of this use of voting.
A different use of voting is as a method of decisionmaking that
will ensure the selection of a right answer; that is, to reduce the
likelihood of error that might otherwise occur in decisionmaking. This
role goes back to the Marquis de Condorcet, who showed that under
suitable hypotheses, a majority vote was more likely to select a correct
answer than any individual acting alone.5 To serve this role, there
4. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 63-79 (1974) (discussing
consensus and authority as decision-making models and the conditions for each).
5. More formally, the Condorcet Jury Theorem can be stated as follows: Suppose that
there are n voters who must decide between two alternatives, one of which is correct and the
other incorrect. Assume that the probability that any given voter will vote for the correct
alternative is greater than one-half. Then the probability that a majority vote will select the
correct alternative approaches one as the number of voters gets larger. MARQUIS DE CONDORCET,
Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of Decision-Making, in SELECTED
WRITINGS 33, 33-71 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976) (1785). See generally Paul H. Edelman, On
Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2002) (analyzing
the assumptions of the Jury Theorem and discussing the mechanics of aggregating individual
choices into probabilities). The conclusion of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that majority vote
leads to more certainty about the correct outcome than do separate individual judgments, holds
under a broad range of assumptions. In particular, one only needs to assume that on average, the
voters are more likely correct than not. One can also relax the independence of the votes to allow
132 [Vol. 62:1:129
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must be an agreed sense among the polity of what the right answer is.
In this role, voting is no longer merely an aggregation of preferences,
but rather an aggregation of information about the true state of the
world. The choice to employ multi-judge appellate panels rather than
a single appellate judge might be seen as an example of voting as an
error-prevention tool. 6
Third, in principal-agent settings, voting provides legitimacy to
a system by which agents act for the larger group. It serves both to
legitimize the agent's choice and to monitor the work of the agent. In
the public sphere, an official's accountability to the electorate is often
the prime guarantee that policymakers will act for the public good.7 A
free and uncorrupted choice by voters ensures the effectiveness of this
oversight. Voting can serve an alternative legitimacy function when
invoked to produce a fair aggregation of preferences among different
groups in an entity or society.8 In addition, in the corporate sphere, a
vote may act as a way to cleanse behavior by an agent that would
otherwise be suspect.9
Voting may also serve "the expressive interest in equal political
standing that inheres to each citizen, taken one by one."10 The act of
voting itself is emblematic of status within the polity. Casting a vote
gives the voter the satisfaction of having her voice heard.
The ability of the vote to serve these assorted roles is
dependent on to whom the franchise is extended. For example, in the
principal-agent context, one might argue that the broader the
franchise, the greater the legitimacy of the agent's actions. On the
other hand, the broader the franchise, the less likely there will be
agreement on a "right" answer, and so it would be less likely that the
vote will serve an error-correcting function. Thus, a key to
for some level of correlation. Kishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and
Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 617-34 (1992). It applies in weighted voting situations
as well. For descriptions of thirteen mathematical theorems premised on the implications of the
Condorcet Jury Theorem, see Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen & Scott L. Feld, Thirteen
Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 261-78 (1983).
6. Of course, this is only an example if one believes that there is a "correct" answer to the
matter under dispute.
7. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV. 593, 605
(2002).
8. Richard H. Pildes, Response, What Kind of Right is the "The Right to Vote'?, 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 45, 46-47 (2007) (noting that although "the right to vote protects several distinct
interests," aggregate interests should be emphasized "in well-established, mature democracies,
[where] most actual conflicts will arise").
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2008) (providing the remedy of ratification
through voter approval to absolve directors of any liability for certain suspect transactions).
10. Pildes, supra note 8, at 46.
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understanding what an election is doing is to understand how the
polity is defined.
Of course the first decision to be made in any context is who
should be eligible to vote. That is, whose preferences will warrant
consideration? In the American political realm, the minimal threshold
has expanded over time, moving from a franchise limited to white
male property owners in the eighteenth century, to the current
extension of the franchise to all citizens over eighteen.1" Thus we have
moved away from linking voting and economic interest to recognizing
that individuals have value regardless of economic contribution. 12
Nevertheless, resident aliens and illegal immigrants cannot vote, even
though they will be affected by many issues decided in a vote. 13 In
addition, convicted felons lose voting rights to varying degrees. 14
There are other voting qualifications in addition to citizenship
and age. Residency is the most substantial of these requirements;
citizens are usually able to vote in only one place, even if they have
attachments to several.1 5 In a representative democracy based on
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (right of citizens to vote cannot be denied on the basis of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude); id. amend. XIX (right of citizen to vote cannot be
denied on the basis of sex); id. amend. XXVI (right of citizen over eighteen to vote cannot be
denied on the basis of age). See generally Chilton Williamson, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM
PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 1760-1860 (1960) (describing the expansion of voting rights in the
United States and analyzing whether the expansion corresponded with changing notions of
property rights).
12. Special purpose bodies still sometimes use property ownership as a requirement for
voting. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981) (holding that the state could rationally limit
the vote to landowners in election for directors of water reclamation districts).
13. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) ("The exclusion of aliens
from basic governmental process is not a deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary
consequence of the community's process of political self-definition."). In some jurisdictions,
resident aliens are permitted to vote in local elections. See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local
Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional, and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1391, 1397-1417, 1460-67 (1993) (describing the prevalence of resident alien voting from
the beginning of the American Republic until the beginning of the twentieth century and
analyzing the reemergence of the practice in small localities in the state of Maryland).
14. For a general description and criticism of the practice of denying convicted felons the
right to vote in this country, see JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006). Scholars have noted that the United
States is an outlier compared to other countries with regard to felony disenfranchisement
practices. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLEN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 30-31 (2007). Despite the academic
criticism, the courts have upheld statutory and constitutional measures prohibiting convicted
felons from voting. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (upholding California
constitutional provision banning felons from voting).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa- (d)-(e) (2000) (requiring states to provide for registration of "all
duly qualified residents" of the states to vote in general elections and restricting a voter's
eligibility either to her current state of residence or her previous one). For a table listing
residency and registration requirements for each state, see Residency Requirements for Voting,
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geographic districts, this requirement conforms with the view of
elections as providing legitimacy to agents of the people. 16
But there are elections, such as referenda, in which the
principal-agent model is not implicated. Then the residency
requirement can be more puzzling. A referendum to raise property
taxes affects the interests of all property owners, even those who do
not reside in the jurisdiction. Why should their preferences not be
accounted for?17 Why should a college student's vote count on a
referendum concerning some long-term development issue when that
student has no intention of staying in the district after graduation?
One explanation for this, beyond the tautological response that
we only care about the preferences of residents, is to view the election
as error correction. By limiting the franchise to those residents in the
district, we attempt to ensure that those voting will be directly
affected by the outcome and will thus have the incentive to invest the
time in discovering the "right" answer. That is, the franchise is
granted in such a way that the interests of the jurisdiction and the
voters are aligned. A citizen who moves will no longer be subject to all
of the benefits and costs of a decision and hence will not be allowed to
vote, even if she retains an economic or social interest in the
jurisdiction.' 8 For similar reasons, political parties in many states
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781452.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). The Supreme Court has
strengthened the connection between a person's current place of residence and her right to vote
in that jurisdiction by declaring lengthy durational residency requirements for potential voters to
be unconstitutional. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972); cf. Glisson v. Mayor of
Savannah Beach, 346 F.2d 135, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1965) (upholding non-resident voting); Saphos
v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 207 F. Supp. 688, 692 (S.D. Ga. 1962) (same), aff'd, 371 U.S. 206
(1962).
16. It is a separate question and not a concern in this discussion as to whether residents
should be divided into single member districts in voting and the configuration of those districts.
See ISSACHAROFF, KARLEN & PILDES, supra note 14, at 540-41.
17. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 329-30 (1993)
(proposing that voters be given the power to choose to vote in the local elections that most affect
their individual interests). Americans abroad can vote in their home states. See U.S. Dep't of
State, 2008 Absentee Voting Information for Americans Abroad, http://travel.
state.gov/law/info/info_2964.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (providing instructions to U.S.
citizens living abroad regarding the process of how they can vote in the 2008 election).
18. The National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (2000),
established requirements for state programs to use when removing persons from voting rolls,
beginning with use of postal change of address forms and followed by certain required
confirmation. In contrast, some countries, such as Mexico and Iraq, let expatriates vote. See
generally Peter J. Spiro, Perfecting Political Diaspora, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 211-17 (2006)
(surveying the countries that allow nonresident citizens to vote and analyzing some of the
methods used).
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restrict voting in their primaries so as to avoid crossover voters with
incentives different from those of the party. 19
Apart from these status-based requirements, regulation of
voting behavior also occurs to ensure the correct alignment between
voting and the common welfare. This can include regulation designed
to block rent-seeking by voters. Thus, most states criminalize vote
buying because of its adverse effect on the process. 20 These restrictions
regulate behavior that may skew the incentive structure facing
voters.
21
III. VOTING IN CORPORATIONS
Shareholder voting, discussed within the framework of the
previous Section, highlights certain differences of voting in a corporate
context. In corporations, the right to vote is granted solely to
shareholders-to the exclusion of employees, creditors, communities,
and others who contribute assets to the enterprise and are affected by
its decisions. 22 As noted above, the choice of the breadth of the
franchise itself tells us something about the purpose voting serves.
The most common justification for the narrow corporate electorate is
that the shareholders' residual interest gives them the best incentives
to make decisions for the corporation. 23 As we later discuss, we see a
more limited role based on error correction.
Three other attributes that distinguish shareholder voting from
the public franchise are relevant to voting in the corporate arena.
First, corporate voting is tied to shares, not shareholders. "One share,
one vote" has a similar ring to "one man, one vote," but the difference
identifies an economic link as the key alignment tool and the
incorporation of the incentives and monitoring that flow from an
19. For information about each state's Republican and Democratic primaries and whether
they are open or closed, see CQ Politics, 2008 Primary Guide, http://innovation.cq
.comprimaries?tab=2 (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). The Supreme Court has upheld the right of the
political parties in each state to hold closed primaries under the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of association. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
20. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1323-38 (2000)
(analyzing the various rationales offered for banning vote buying in the political arena).
21. Given the remote likelihood that one person's vote will make a difference in any
particular election, there often seems insufficient incentive for incurring any costs to exercise the
franchise. Voting, in this sense, may be best explained by the participation of those who have a
taste for voting or who view it as something like a spectator sport in which participating provides
an additional and intense connection to the proceedings.
22. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2008) (requiring directors to be elected at each
annual meeting of shareholders).
23. FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF LAW 68 (1991).
Theories of shareholder voting are discussed in more detail in Part IV infra.
136 [Vol. 62:1:129
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economic focus. Early American corporate law often specified one vote
per shareholder, which might have been appropriate for a corporation
with a small number of shareholders who interacted with and knew
each other.24 Indeed, shareholder voting today serves a different
purpose in a close corporation where there is no market for shares and
a more intimate relationship among the participants. 25 After the
Industrial Revolution and the growth of publicly held corporations,
"one share, one vote," and not "one man, one vote," became the norm
for corporate voting, enshrining an economic motivation for
shareholder voting in public corporations. 26
Second, the ability to buy and sell shares creates an additional
dynamic, driven by economics, that simply is not possible in public
voting. Moving the focus from a market for voters to a market for
shares permits a more direct connection between costs and benefits
that may counter the rational apathy of voters in public voting. At
least where a change in control is possible, any shareholder has an
incentive to investigate and vote given that all shareholders can share
in the higher price available for alternative control.27 Even more, the
result is to permit a form of intensity voting that does not exist in the
public sphere. If you care enough to spend money to buy the shares
(and if you have the money), you can increase your influence over the
decision. 28 Moreover, larger shareholders have the incentive to incur
the costs of research to decide which outcome of a vote will best
increase the value of the company's shares.
Third, shareholder voting is not the fount from which all
corporate authority flows. Indeed, corporations statutes uniformly
provide that all corporate authority is in the board.29 That shareholder
voting is not designed as the plenary governance mechanism can be
seen in the two major contexts in which shareholder voting is
24. David Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the
Rule of 'One Share, One Vote,' 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1970) (outlining the development of
the one share, one vote rule).
25. See infra Part IV.
26. Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share,
One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 693 (1986).
27. There will be a discount reflecting the chance of obtaining control, but this discount will
not eliminate the absolute value of opting for a positive proposal.
28. See Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 137 (2000) (describing
situations where buying corporate votes may be "useful and desirable").
29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors .... "); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2008) ("All corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed
by or under the direction of, its board of directors .... ").
2009]
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required-election of directors and approval of mergers-and three
other areas in which voting is permissive-bylaw amendments,
cleansing of conflicts, and precatory votes via nonbinding shareholder
resolutions.
Election of directors. Corporate law provides for the annual
election of directors by shareholders, certainly the most visible
statement of shareholder primacy in corporate decisionmaking. 30
However, the statement is less powerful than it first appears.
Typically there is only one slate of nominees, presented by the board
itself, and directors can be elected by a simple plurality. 31 If all
shareholders but one were sufficiently unimpressed as to withhold
their votes or not vote at all, the nominees would still be elected.
Despite the hand-wringing that such corporate voting looks like the
elections of the old time Soviet Union, the legitimacy of this overall
system of corporate governance is not compromised by frequent
uncontested elections. 32 Indeed, for most time periods, corporate law is
satisfied to have a self-reproducing board. The other constraints on
director behavior (e.g., markets, contracts, gatekeepers, norms) work
sufficiently well for much of corporate governance. Markets permit a
low-cost exit to those who disagree with current corporate policy, an
exit choice that is much less costly than what may exist in the public
setting.33 What is important about the vote is that shareholders are
able to replace directors when they are blocking a value-increasing
transaction for entrenchment reasons. Thus the vote by shareholders
exhibits less of the legitimizing function in the selection of directors
than one sees in a political election of a representative, and more of
the error-correcting purpose as to directors' behavior.
The shareholder power to elect directors is further limited by
the presence of "staggered boards" in a majority of American public
30. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (requiring that an annual meeting of shareholders
be held for the election of directors).
31. Plurality voting is a default rule under state statutes and, in the face of sustained
pressure from institutional shareholders in the last few years, many corporations have added
provisions to their bylaws or articles requiring a board member who fails to receive a majority of
votes to resign. Delaware law permits a director to make an irrevocable resignation conditioned
on failing to receive a specified vote. Id. § 141(b). Efforts to mandate majority rule either by
changes to state or federal law have been made during this decade but have not succeeded.
32. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 398 (1986) (discussing solutions to
collective action problem of shareholder voting including takeovers and arguing that value "does
not depend ... on whether the voting rights are ever exercised by the shareholders in ordinary
times").
33. Exit is possible in the public sector but at substantially higher costs, such as the cost of
moving. See Kirk Semple, Rise of Chavez Sends Venezuelans to Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2008, at Al (describing surge in immigrants to the United States escaping the political market of
Venezuela).
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corporations; by which, only one-third of a board of directors is elected
each year. 34 Thus, control often requires success in two voting cycles,
and in the meantime any money spent by the insurgent to buy shares
or finance the election contest provides no return. Even worse, the
corporation to which the insurgent's money has been committed
continues to be run by the very group against whom the insurgent has
just campaigned. Efforts to speed up the timetable are hindered by
legal limits on non-managers' ability to call a special meeting of
shareholders 35 or to act by written consent.3 6
Mergers. Corporations statutes also specify shareholder voting
for approval of mergers and similar fundamental corporate changes.
37
The crucial governance fact here is that this shareholder vote can only
occur if the board of directors decides to put the deal before the
shareholders. The board thus has a gatekeeper power. If it does not
wish for a merger to happen, it is not obligated to put the matter
before the shareholders, hardly an indication of shareholder primacy.
Shareholder participation in merger decisions has evolved
from an early focus on property rights to what now can be better
described as a desire for error correction. Until 1890 or so, mergers
were only possible through the unanimous consent of all owners. The
merger was seen as altering the contract rights of each shareholder,
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (allowing directors to be divided into one, two, or three
classes). Such a provision, like the constitutional structure provided for the U.S. Senate, slows
change and provides continuity. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (providing tenure classifications
for U.S. Senators). Yet a change of control is harder in most boards than in the public body.
Unlike the Senate, most corporate insurgents start from a zero to one hundred percent split on
the board and, even if they were to win a landslide in the first election, they would only control
one-third of the board, which operates by majority rule. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 141(b) ("The
vote of the majority of the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be
the act of the board of directors .. "); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §8.24(c) ("If a quorum is present
when a vote is taken, the affirmative vote of a majority of directors present is the act of the board
of directors .... "). The number of large, publicly held corporations with staggered boards has
been declining since 2003 and is now less than a majority of the largest American public
corporations. Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
149, 150 (2008).
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (providing that a special meeting may be called by the
board or any person authorized by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws). It is uncommon in
Delaware public corporations for the certificate to authorize shareholders to call a special
meeting. In contrast, the Model Business Corporation Act specifies that ten percent of
shareholders can call a special meeting, a number that can be raised no higher than twenty-five
percent by the articles of incorporation. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.02(a)(2).
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (authorizing shareholder action to take place through
written consent unless otherwise provided in the certificate). It is common among publicly held
corporations to include a provision to limit such action by written consent.
37. Id. § 251(c) (mandating that a merger be approved by the vote of a majority of
shareholders entitled to vote).
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which required each shareholder's assent.38 Such a rule ill-served the
needs of the American economy during the Industrial Revolution, and
so states lowered the required approval to a supermajority (and later a
simple majority) of the shareholder vote. 39 To compensate for lowering
the threshold of votes necessary to approve a merger, states offered
dissenting shareholders the right to receive the fair value of their
shares if they did not wish to participate in the changed venture.40
The directors and transactional planners of the corporation
have considerable flexibility to avoid this shareholder vote in most
settings. Typically, American statutes do not require shareholders of
the acquiring corporation to vote on stock deals in which the
corporation's shares increase by less than twenty percent. 41 Directors
get to make ordinary decisions, including small acquisitions, but
certain extraordinary matters must also be approved by the
shareholders. Yet the directors of the acquiring company can avoid
shareholder voting entirely by structuring the transaction as a
purchase of assets (which is often the financial equivalent of a
merger) 42 or a triangular merger in which the actual merger is
between the target corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of the
acquiring corporation.43 Stock exchange listing standards, in a rare
display of disagreement with the lenient standards of state law,
require shareholder voting in a series of transactions in which the
acquiring corporation's stock increases by more than twenty percent,
which would take in many acquisitions done using the triangular
method. 44 An acquiring corporation can avoid even this requirement
by acquiring the target stock for cash rather than stock, as Time Inc.
38. NORMAN LATTIN, LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS 571 (1971).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.04.
40. See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in
Corporate Law, 84 GEO L.J. 1, 3-4 (1995) (describing the move by the states from unanimity
requirement for merger to requirement for supermajority vote and appraisal rights for dissenting
shareholders).
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(f) (providing that, notwithstanding section 251(c), no vote
is necessary if the certificate of incorporation is not changed and if the number of shares does not
increase more than twenty percent).
42. See id. § 271 (requiring approval of the shareholders for the sale of substantially all the
corporation's assets without mentioning the purchasing corporation).
43. A triangular merger is not specifically identified by statute but is the result of the
addition of a third party to the plan of merger. This third corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary
of the buyer, becomes one of the two parties to what is otherwise an ordinary merger. The
directors and shareholders of the subsidiary must approve the merger, but this is a mere
formality because the subsidiary has only one shareholder, the acquiring corporation. The result
is that the shareholders of the acquiring company are excluded from voting on the transaction.
44. See, e.g., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c) (2007) (requiring shareholder vote
prior to issuance of stock in excess of twenty percent in any transaction or series of related
transactions).
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did in its well-publicized combination with Warner. 45 For acquiring
corporations, therefore, the requirement for shareholder voting in
mergers is now mostly optional.
For the acquired corporation, the requirement for shareholder
voting remains intact. Sellers of substantially all of the corporate
assets have to follow the same voting rules as a merger participant. 46
The reasons for the distinction between the selling shareholders and
the buying shareholders have been much debated over the years. The
most plausible explanation, from Ron Gilson, is based on recognizing a
difference in risk to the selling shareholders, given the other available
governance mechanisms. 47 Shareholders in the acquiring corporation
see a change in their investment, even a large change, but their
managers remain subject to the same constraints provided by the
market, voting, and contracts. In contrast, the shareholders of the
target face a different worry. Their managers are in a final period,
compromised by a short time horizon, and thus there is more reason to
seek a specific shareholder check on the managers' decisionmaking.
While other explanations are possible, the central point is that voting
by shareholders is best explained as error correction of managers
rather than as an inherent shareholder right to participate.
When the market for corporate control developed to the point
that bidders could purchase a majority of shares via a tender offer, the
voting rights attached to those shares permitted the bidder to gain
control of the corporation without director participation. Delaware
courts permitted boards to create barriers such as poison pills that
effectively provided a gatekeeping role for the board in tender offers as
well as traditional merger transactions. 48 Early in the history of
45. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147-49 (Del. 1990). After Time
negotiated a merger with Warner, Time stock was trading in the $120 range, reflecting the
benefits of that merger. Subsequently, Paramount proposed an acquisition of Time first at $175
per Time share and then at $200, making it unlikely that Time shareholders would approve the
lower-valued deal with Warner. Because the directors of Time favored a merger with Warner
despite Paramount's higher bid, they restructured the Warner deal into a tender offer to avoid a
shareholder vote. Id. The requirement that Time shareholders vote on the merger deal actually
came from the stock exchange listing standards, not state law, illustrating the point in the text.
Id. at 1146.
46. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8., § 271 (requiring shareholder approval for the sale of
substantially all the corporation's assets). While target shareholders have a vote, they are denied
appraisal rights in Delaware. Id. § 262.
47. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 721 (2d ed. 1995). When market constraints fail, legal constraints play a crucial
role; when target shareholders are subject to a final period problem and cannot rely on their
management for protection, they require instead "the barrier of a shareholder vote as protection
against management." Id.
48. Delaware courts developed an intermediate standard of review to address director
action. For example, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court found
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takeover litigation and the development of poison pill defensive
tactics, the Delaware chancellor ruled there may come a time in a
takeover saga when the directors must defer and allow the
shareholders to decide, 49  but the Delaware Supreme Court
subsequently termed that reading too expansive. 50 What Delaware has
settled on is that the board can use its normal corporate authority to
implement defensive tactics that block shareholder decisions made via
selling, as in a tender offer, provided the avenue for shareholder
voting is not completely closed. The opening that must remain does
not have to be very great. In a later case, the court approved defensive
tactics in which the only way that shareholders could prevail would be
if a hostile bidder were to undertake and win two separate annual
elections to empanel a board that would remove a poison pill and
approve a merger.51 This increases the importance of the shareholder
right to replace directors described above.
Bylaws. Corporations statutes authorize shareholder votes to
adopt, amend, or repeal the corporation's bylaws. 52 The impact of this
vote, however, is diminished because statutes typically also provide
directors a parallel power to amend bylaws. Indeed, this is how most
bylaw amendments occur.53 Shareholder voting to amend bylaws has
been stunted by longstanding but unresolved doubts over whether
such power could be used to produce bylaws that intrude into director
control of the corporation, provided by section 141 of the Delaware
statute. 54 In recent shareholder proxy seasons, some shareholder
governance proposals have been presented as binding bylaw
amendments, leading to a 2008 Delaware Supreme Court decision
that reaffirmed both shareholder power to amend bylaws and section
141's limits on such power. 55
that defensive tactics, including poison pills, should be judged by a two step process, determining
first whether there was a threat and second whether the defensive tactic was a proportional
response to that threat. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., the same court required that directors get the best price reasonably available for
shareholders when the company is up for sale. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
49. City Capital Assocs. L.P. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988).
50. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152-54.
51. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-91 (Del. 1995).
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2008).
53. Id.
54. See id. § 109(b) ("The bylaws may contain provisions not inconsistent with law or with
the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its
affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers, or
employees.").
55. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231-33 (Del. 2008)
(answering two questions certified by the Securities and Exchange Commission).
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Cleansing. When directors have a conflict that may taint their
actions on behalf of the collective, corporations statutes permit a
disinterested shareholder vote to substitute for the conflicted board
action. This shareholder action is not the only method to address this
conflict-action by disinterested directors or approval by a court can
also accomplish the same result. Nevertheless, this provides an
additional setting for shareholder voting.5 6 The vote in this situation is
limited to disinterested shareholders, a requirement which ensures
that the voters' interests are aligned with the group.5 7 This statutory
safe harbor is consistent with case law in various conflict settings. 58
Similarly, the Internal Revenue Code conditions tax deductions for
certain manager compensation on prior approval by shareholders.5 9
Stock exchange listing standards similarly require shareholder
approval for options.60 Each of these requirements seems motivated by
the risk of conflict in these particular corporate decisions, which
shareholder voting can help correct.
Precatory. The most active issues of shareholder voting today
arise under federal law in areas where the state corporations statutes
are silent. During the New Deal, Congress and the Roosevelt
Administration chose not to federalize state corporations codes but
rather to supplement state law with new federal rules, principally
disclosure-based, where existing state law seemed inadequate. 61 Since
1934, federal securities regulation and proxy rules in particular have
focused on arming shareholders with enough information to vote on
the issues put to them under state law, namely elections of directors
and merger transactions.62
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144. The Delaware statute is written narrowly so as to block
only the old common law rule deeming such conflicted transactions void or voidable because of
the conflict, but the broader practical impact has been narrower judicial review of such
transactions.
57. Delaware reached this result by a somewhat circuitous path. Its statute does not specify
which shareholders may vote in a cleansing action, but the parallel and immediately preceding
subsection does specify that directors seeking to cleanse must be disinterested. Id. Nevertheless,
the Delaware court has in effect read "disinterested shareholder" into the statute. See Marciano
v. Naksah, 535 A.2d 400, 404-05 (Del. 1987) (stating that "interested director transactions were
deemed voidable only after ... a determination of whether the disputed conduct received the
approval of a noninterested majority of directors or shareholders").
58. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976) (holding that shareholder
ratification is ineffectual when a majority of votes were cast by interested managers of the
company).
59. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii) (2000).
60. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.08 (2007).
61. See 1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 178 (3d ed. 1989).
62. A key initial focus was shareholder voting, reflecting the premise that inadequate
disclosure permitted managers to gain shareholder approval without sufficient monitoring. See
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 14 (1934) ("[Section 14(a) is intended to] control the conditions under
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The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") recognized
in its first decade that disclosure was insufficient without an adequate
supply of items on which to vote. Rule 14a-8 extended the shareholder
voice by permitting individual shareholders to propose agenda items
for collective shareholder action beyond those submitted by directors. 63
In deciding what issues are appropriate for the shareholder ballot,
Rule 14a-8 ostensibly defers to state corporate law by requiring that
the proposal be appropriate for shareholder action under state law.64
State courts and legislatures have remained silent as to what
proposals are appropriate, beyond the election of directors and
approval of mergers just discussed. In this vacuum, the SEC has
greatly expanded the number of things on which shareholders can
vote, so long as they are precatory (i.e., suggestive and nonbinding).65
These proposals express the views of the shareholders, but do not
determine corporate policy, which is left to the directors. In earlier
years, many of these agenda items related to issues of concern to the
larger society, such as the Vietnam War or animal protection.66 More
recently, precatory proposals have focused on efforts to change
corporate governance and institute a greater sharing of power
between shareholders and directors.
The challenge for any theory of shareholder voting, including
those described in the following Section, is to explain this voting
pattern. As we develop below, we believe that this reality on the
ground is best explained by an error-correction purpose for
shareholder voting, as opposed to a purpose grounded in shareholder
property rights or any related theory.
IV. THEORIES OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING
None of the existing approaches to shareholder voting do
particularly well in explaining the existing system or why we should
expect shareholders to vote in some matters but not others.
Anthropologically, voting paired with the typical financial rights
which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses
which ... [have] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders.").
63. Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 109-12 (1988).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2008) (providing that a company may exclude a proposal if it
is not a proper subject of action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the
company's organization).
65. Id. § 240.14a-8(i) note to (i)(1).
66. See, e.g., Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1985)
(considering a shareholder proposal relating to the procedure used to force-feed geese for
production in France of pate de foie gras imported by the company).
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attached to shares provided comfort to individuals considering the
purchase of an ownership stake in an entity the investors would not
control, as separation of ownership and control became widespread
throughout the economy.67 More generally, effective shareholder
control over managers is regularly cited as a prerequisite to sound
corporate governance, 68 echoing the legitimacy argument suggested in
Blasius and quoted in our opening paragraph. In such arguments,
shareholders are often cast as the necessary counterweight to the
managerialist corporate control that has been the defining worry of
corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardner Means wrote of the
separation of ownership and control in 1932.69 Lucian Bebchuk argues
for greater shareholder power to give directors incentives to serve the
shareholder interest and to restore directors' accountability in a
system lacking other adequate mechanisms. 70 Bebchuk's argument,
based on the role of the franchise in contributing to shareholder value,
rather than the intrinsic value of corporate democracy, 71 has provoked
challenges as to the strength of the link to such value. 72 Other than
telling us there is not enough shareholder voting, Bebchuk's theory
does not tell us very much about when and how voting should be used.
If we are to be able to explain why shareholders vote, when they
should vote, and what information they need in order to vote
effectively, we need a more robust theory of shareholder voting.
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel present a more
comprehensive theory of voting as filling the gaps that necessarily
appear in contracts and assigning the gap-filling role to the group with
the best economic incentive to do so. Grounded within their broader
67. See also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 70 (asserting that from the
survival of voting one may infer that voting is beneficial).
68. See, e.g., Council Directive 2007/36, The Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in
Listed Companies, 2007 O.J. (L 184/17) 1, available at http://www.eurosif.org/eu-
eurosiflobbying/shareholders-rights/eudirective_on_shareholdersrights (follow "Directive
2007/36/EC" hyperlink) ("[E]ffective shareholder control is a prerequisite to sound corporate
governance and should, therefore, be facilitated and encouraged.").
69. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 119-25 (1933); see, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 913 (2005) (asserting that absent
shareholder power to initiate, the evolution of governance arrangements designed in part to
constrain and regulate management have been left to a process controlled by management).
70. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 677,
732 (2007).
71. Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 842-43; Bebchuk, supra note 70, at 678.
72. Jonathan Macey, Too Many Notes and Not Enough Votes: Lucian Bebchuk and Emperor
Joseph II Kvetch About Contested Director Elections and Mozart's Seraglio, 93 VA. L. REV. 759,
769 (2007) (criticizing the lack of a baseline empirical measure specifying how many contested
elections are enough to establish a board's legitimacy); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of
Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 798-99 (2007) (discussing the weak evidence favoring
shareholder governance).
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theory of contract and private ordering, they observe that where
contracts are not complete, something must fill in the details. The
shareholders hold the residual interest in the corporation and so "have
the appropriate incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions .... The
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the
marginal costs. They therefore have the right incentives to exercise
discretion."73 In their theory, this right to exercise discretion follows
the residual claim. For practical reasons shareholders will delegate to
managers, but nevertheless "managers exercise authority at the
sufferance of investors."74
The emphasis on shareholders as residual claimants has been
challenged, particularly after the development of options theory,
which posits debt holders as residual claimants as well. 75 More
importantly for our analysis, Easterbrook and Fischel's focus on the
residual holder's right to delegate gap-filling would seem to support a
more expansive view of shareholder action 76 than what we describe
above. 77 If shareholders merely delegate their roles to fill gaps, why
should the law prevent them from exercising their authority whenever
they deem it appropriate? The Easterbrook and Fischel approach
would seem to give shareholders carte blanche power to decide any
issue, whether or not the directors approve.
Directors, however, are not agents in the pure sense of
extending the reach of shareholders (as principals) to do what they
lack the time or expertise to do.78 In all American corporations
73. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 68.
74. Id. at 67 (noting that shareholder voting is expensive and generates collective action
problems and that managers serve as a "collective information-generating agency").
75. The development of options theory has challenged the position of shareholders as sole
residual owners and has created the argument that, once a firm has issued debt, the debt holders
can be said to own the right to the corporation's cash flow and to have sold a call option to the
shareholders. "Put differently, options theory demonstrates that bondholders and equity holders
each share contingent control and bear residual risk in firms." Lynn A. Stout, Lecture and
Commentary on the Social Responsibility of Corporate Entities: Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments
for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002).
76. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 68 (explaining that, for decisions like new
products and new plants, all of the actors except shareholders lack the appropriate incentives).
77. Their theory is consistent with the widely noted but unadopted principle that directors
should be passive in response to hostile takeovers. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1161, 1164 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics,
and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733, 1750 (1981). The Delaware Supreme Court
rejected any such notion. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 n.10 (observing
that even Easterbrook and Fischel conceded that no court or legislature had adopted their
theory).
78. Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996) (holding that
directors acting in the "ordinary course of their service as directors" are not agents of the
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statutes, directors, rather than shareholders, have the plenary
governance role in the enterprise; all corporate power is placed in
their hands. 79 This centralized authority structure provides efficiency
that cannot be replicated with shareholder decisionmaking except in
the smallest of ownership structures. Stephen Bainbridge advocates
for such a director-centric view of corporate governance based on the
work of Ronald Coase80 and the social choice theory developed by
Kenneth Arrow.8 1 He argues that the economic efficiency of the
corporate form hinges on the ability of the board to act by fiat rather
than some more democratic method of consensus.8 2
The advocates of both shareholder primacy and director
primacy acknowledge the risk that directors may be diverted to
empire building or toward entrenching action and will fail to monitor
sufficiently the managers engaging in similar behavior. Following
Easterbrook and Fischel and others, Bainbridge argues that
shareholders, and only shareholders, assume such a monitoring role,
albeit a limited one. He argues that the monitor must be limited to a
single constituency because to do otherwise would produce mixed and
possibly unstable signals, thus undermining the monitoring role.83
Like Easterbrook and Fischel, he suggests that the shareholders are
the right constituency to serve the role because they are "the only
corporate constituent with a residual, unfixed, ex post claim on
corporate assets and earnings."8 4 As many have recognized, the
information costs and collective action problems associated with a
shareholder vote are substantial, and the board itself operates "within
a pervasive web of accountability mechanisms that substitute for
monitoring."8' 5 For Bainbridge, these characteristics suggest a limited
corporation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. (f)(2) (2006) ("Although a
corporation's shareholders elect its directors . . . , the directors are neither the shareholders' nor
the corporation's agents as defined in this section.")
79. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors ....").
80. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386-405 (1937).
81. ARROW, supra note 4, at 15-29.
82. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 601, 621-22 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Rights]; Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Investor Activism: Reshaping the Playing Field? 5 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ
Research Paper No. 08-12, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1130969.
83. Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Rights, supra note 82, at 610.
84. Id. at 613.
85. Id. at 625.
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shareholder oversight role, so weak, in fact, that for him "they scarcely
qualify as part of corporate governance."' 6
Advocates of different versions of director primacy emphasize
not so much the information costs of shareholder action or the other
constraints on director action, but the longstanding concern that
shareholders, if empowered without check, would cause the
corporation to take opportunistic advantage of other stakeholders.
Much of the argument against unlimited shareholder power that
fueled the antitakeover movement of the 1980s reflected such fears of
shareholder self-interest.8 7 The recent activities of hedge funds
discussed in the next part of this Article have provoked additional
director primacy arguments by academics such as Iman Anabtawi 88
and practitioners such as Martin Lipton and his partners. These
arguments focus explicitly on the intra-shareholder conflict that
occurs when shareholders are given a larger franchise.8 9
This director primacy theory, in its various forms, is not
sufficiently detailed to attack the problem we wish to address.
Bainbridge accepts shareholders as the constituency who should be
able to vote for directors but believes this process is of so little use
compared to other possible accountability mechanisms that it is
scarcely part of corporate governance. For him and for Anabtawi and
Lipton et al., the one thing that is clear is that we should fear too
much shareholder voting, just as Bebchuk concludes that we have too
little shareholder voting.90 What we should seek from any theory of
86. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 569 (2003); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20:
Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 812 (2006) ("Shareholder
voting rights are properly seen as simply one of many accountability tools available, not as part
of the firm's decision-making system."). In light of the limitations to which these rights are
subject, shareholder voting rights are not a very important accountability tool.
87. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101,
104 (1979) (questioning "whether the long-term interests of the nation's corporate system and
economy should be jeopardized in order to benefit speculators interested not in the vitality and
continued existence of the business enterprises in which they have bought shares, but only in a
quick profit on the sale of those shares").
88. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
Rev. 561, 561 (2006) ("[I]t is more plausible that shareholders will use any incremental power
conferred on them to benefit their private interests at the expense of the firm .... ").
89. See, e.g., Theodore N. Mirvis et al., Bebchuk's Case for Increasing Shareholder Power:
An Opposition 8 (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 586, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=990057 ("Empowering shareholders under these circumstances ... risks
destroying corporate value and compromising the interests of non-hedged shareholders, and is
socially inefficient as well.").
90. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout suggest another variation of director primacy that
emphasizes the ability of a board to act as a mediating hierarch, thereby allowing various
constituents to contribute form-specific capital to the enterprise by minimizing their fear of being
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shareholder voting is an explanation of when (and why) we would
expect the shareholders to make better decisions than the board. Only
then can we decide which issues are suitable for a shareholder vote
and which are not.
We accept that much of the efficiency of the corporate form lies
in having a central decisionmaker, the board. Because of the
separation of ownership and control inherent in the form and the
concomitant possibility of self-interest, some group must be authorized
to monitor the behavior of the board. Consistent with the various prior
theories, we believe that group should be homogeneous to avoid
difficulties in achieving consensus; we believe shareholders are that
group. But here we diverge from the theories already presented in
explaining why shareholders are the appropriate constituency for
monitoring and how to determine the breadth of monitoring necessary.
The costs of information and the barriers to collective shareholder
action are substantial, so any performance measure has to circumvent
those problems. Shareholders are the appropriate group to monitor
the board and correct errors because they are uniquely sensitive to the
principal signal indicating a deviation of the board from its duty to the
corporation: the market price of the corporation's stock.91
Note that our justification for shareholder voting is not based
in any property right to residual value. It is founded on the
assumption that the best signal for identifying board error is the stock
price and that shareholders are the constituency with the most
incentive to monitor that signal. This distinction is important because
any financial engineering that undercuts that signal can distort the
incentives and undermine the value of the shareholder franchise. If
the right to vote were solely based on property rights, then financial
engineering would be less of a concern.
Our view of the shareholder vote, then, turns on information
aggregation and error correction. As we discussed earlier, if there is
an objectively "right" answer, a majority vote of independent voters,
each of whom has a better than even chance of being correct, results in
taken advantage of by other stakeholders. This variation gives a more positive view of what
directors do but says very little about the role for the shareholder vote. See Margaret N. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999)
(asserting that "the nominal existence of shareholder voting rights.., does not pose a serious
challenge to the mediating hierarchy model").
91. Stout has argued that stock price is the best available measure, albeit in a context in
which she is generally skeptical of shareholder primacy and frames her positive statements from
the perspective of judicial enforcement of directors' duties toward shareholders rather than
shareholder self-help via voting. She observes: "[A] shareholder primacy rule leaves directors
with far less leeway to claim that they are doing a good job for the firm when, in fact, they are
doing well mostly for themselves." Stout, supra note 75, at 1200.
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an outcome that is very likely correct-indeed the majority vote is
much more likely to be correct than any given voter. 92 Here the "right"
answer is the option that increases the share price. Shareholder
voting will satisfy the necessary requirements to gain the information
advantage as structured in the Condorcet theorem. The theorem's
premise that voters will expend effort to gather information is clearly
satisfied by large shareholders who have an economic incentive to
gather information, and sometimes a fiduciary duty to do so.93 Even if
small shareholders are not gathering information, or are doing so in a
random manner, large shareholders still produce sufficient
information so that a vote by the group is more likely to produce the
correct outcome than any shareholder acting alone. This error-
correcting approach can justify the claim that a shareholder vote is at
least as likely to give the correct outcome as the decision of the board,
and thus a shareholder vote can act as an effective monitoring force.
Our shift in focus as to the defining reason for shareholder
voting gives us more traction on the types of issues that should be
monitored. We agree with Bainbridge that the "[p]reservation of
managerial discretion should always be the default presumption,"94
and thus monitoring is only required when the board is obviously
compromised. But our focus on stock price as the signal of board error
gives us some more information. The shareholders should only act as
monitors when the possible board conflict would change the stock
price. If there is no signal from the market, then there is little reason
to believe that the shareholders will effectively monitor the board.
While the reliability of the market price as a signal for the need to
monitor director decisions is good, and likely better than possible
alternatives, there are times when this is not so. In Part V.B, we will
discuss the likelihood of shareholder opportunism in the context of
removing a poison pill, the possible use of director power to restrain
opportunism in this context, and the need to balance the two risks of
selfish board behavior and selfish shareholder behavior in poison pill
disputes. But recognizing a system that takes into account these two
core risks does not detract from the utility of focusing on error
correction as the theory for shareholder voting with the most
explanatory power.
92. See supra note 5 (explaining the Condorcet Jury Theorem).
93. The success of RiskMetrics's Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") and Governance
Metrics International indicates the amount of resources institutional investors commit to
obtaining securities information.
94. Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Rights, supra note 82, at 628.
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It is worth noting the bounds of what this theory seeks to
explain. We seek to explain the role of voting in public corporations
with dispersed shareholders; the contrasting nature of voting in close
corporations or public corporations with a controlling shareholder is
beyond the theory's scope. Not all corporations make use of the
separation and specialization of function permitted by the corporate
form. Close corporations and corporations with controlling
shareholders are subject to the same statutory rules regarding voting
procedures. But the use of voting by those entities does not necessarily
tell us very much about the purpose of voting in the public
corporation. Indeed, corporate law is full of examples of enterprises
that use the corporate form but desire to avoid some of the core
corporate characteristics. 95 Voting within close corporations or by
controlling shareholders is the mechanism to implement the property
rights that follow from acquiring the controlling interest in a corporate
entity.96 It serves to aggregate social preferences but does not
aggregate information. The likelihood of the correct decision when
there is a vote with a majority shareholder is exactly the likelihood of
the majority shareholder alone getting the right answer; voting does
not improve accuracy. The electoral process does provide a method in
such a setting to aggregate social preferences and to permit the
majority's preference to prevail (as opposed to some other system of
aggregating social preferences which might let a monarch or dictator's
preference prevail). What makes voting distinctive in a public
corporation with a separation of ownership and control is that it
specifies conditions in which shareholders can improve the
decisionmaking function of directors.
Shareholder voting is sometimes conflated with broader views
of shareholder primacy, as illustrated in the oft-quoted legal principle
that directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of
shareholders. The two are not the same thing. When shareholder
voting is possible, the decision is made by shareholders without
intermediation by directors or judges. In contrast, when a judge
interprets fiduciary duty to limit actions directors may take, the
involvement of both directors and judges usually operates to soften the
degree of shareholder determination. Thus, fiduciary duty sometimes
limits director actions that interfere with shareholder choice. The
95. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1.16 (rev. 3d ed. 2004) (describing how close corporations avoid core corporate
characteristics).
96. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 67 ("Voting serves its principal role in
permitting those who have gathered up equity claims to exercise control.").
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Unocal and Revlon decisions that provide a higher, intermediate level
of review to defenses to corporate takeovers are prominent examples. 97
This difference between shareholder primacy enforced by judges
through fiduciary duty and shareholder voting reflects the theory of
voting we seek to develop here. There are times when voting will work
better than judging in addressing decisionmaking within the
corporation.
In summary, we have developed an alternative theory of
shareholder voting, based on error correction, capable of explaining
more of the visible pattern of voting by shareholders. Shareholders are
the unique homogeneous constituency who are sensitive to the stock
price, which is a decent proxy for the interests of the corporation.
Restricting the vote to shareholders aligns the interest of the
corporation with the voters. Because the vote is granted only to those
who benefit from a higher stock price, there is an objective measure of
"right" for the questions brought before them: the "right" answer is the
one that increases the stock price. This assures that the shareholders'
decision effectively monitors the actions of the board. Our theory
allows us to examine questions such as which issues are appropriate
for oversight-those which will change the stock price-and what
financial engineering arrangements act to undercut the value of this
monitoring regime by separating ownership from financial interest. In
the next Section, we give examples of how to apply these insights in
real-world situations.
V. APPLICATIONS
In this Section we explore some of the consequences of our
theory of corporate voting. In Subpart A we consider the appropriate
response to "empty voting," the phenomenon in which a shareholder
has sold his or her economic interest in the stock but has retained the
voting right. Our theory argues for a more active enforcement of the
alignment between the voting interest and the financial interest of the
shareholder. In Subpart B we apply our theory to the question of what
issues are appropriate for a shareholder vote. Here we focus on the
97. Yet the Revlon rule requiring the directors to get the best price for shareholders in an
acquisition effectively has been made an option, avoidable by the planners' choosing a share-for-
share merger, except in the unusual situation in which the target is being sold to an acquirer
with a controlling shareholder. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) (holding that in light of the change of control to be effected by the
Paramount-Viacom combination, the Paramount directors were obligated to secure the best price
for shareholders).
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connection between the issue and the stock price as well as the
possibility that shareholders may be as compromised as the board.
A. Shareholder Alignment and the New Technology
Innovations in technology and finance have made it easier to
separate voting from the financial claims of shares. This disconnect
compromises the ability of voting to perform its assigned role. Like
derivatives generally, we have seen new bundles of rights created and
marketed to investors whose risk preferences match those bundles.
These innovations have challenged the early twentieth-century view
that a combined voting and financial interest was an essential
attribute of shares. Twenty-five years ago, Easterbrook and Fischel
began from a foundation that it was not possible to separate the vote
from the equity interest, but this view has been overtaken by new
financial realities. 98 The financial innovation of recent decades has
multiplied the possible strategies and effects; today the market
permits providers to slice and dice the shareholder's interest in a
variety of ways, and investors are willing to buy these separate
interests. Equity swaps occur in a variety of shapes and sizes. Lending
of shares has become a massive business. 99
These new slices make possible a variety of transactions that
were not possible in earlier times, including voting transactions that
may be the dark underbelly of these innovations. The Mylan/King
Pharmaceuticals acquisition has become the most visible of these
transactions, although Henry Hu and Bernard Black in a recent paper
list eighty examples in twenty countries.100  The Mylan/King
transaction involved a merger between two pharmaceutical companies
in which Mylan Laboratories would acquire King Pharmaceuticals in
exchange for Mylan shares. As a merger, this action required approval
by the shareholders of each company. 101 This deal reflected a typical
division of gains in acquisitions where the target shareholders receive
a premium for their shares, and the acquirer's shares retain the same
value or decline slightly.10 2 Given the premium, approval by the King
98. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 74.
99. A recent survey put the balance of outstanding stock loans as of mid-year 2005 at $1.5
trillion. John Hintze, Automation Has Greater Impact as Securities Lending Increases, SEC.
INDUSTRY NEWS, May 8, 2006, at 33.
100. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II:
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 661-81 (2008).
101. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining the threshold of votes necessary to
approve a merger).
102. See ROBERT F. BRUNER, APPLIED MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 568-70 (University ed.
2004) (providing a summary table of acquirer and target returns upon acquisition).
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shareholders was likely; approval by the Mylan shareholders was
more in doubt. Perry, operator of a hedge fund with about 7 million
shares in King and a possible $28 million gain, sought tz improve the
odds of receiving the premium for the King shares by purchasing 9.9
percent of the Mylan shares prior to the vote. To hedge the economic
risk of his purchase (including any additional possible loss to Mylan
shares because of perceived negative economic effects of the merger),
Perry entered into swap transactions in which he effectively disposed
of the financial risk but kept the votes. The result was that he could
influence the outcome of the acquirer's votes even though he had no
financial interest in the acquirer and in fact was operating at cross-
purposes to the interests of the acquiring shareholders as a whole. 10 3
Allowing empty voting completely undercuts our justification of
shareholder voting. Retaining the vote without a financial interest
eliminates the error-correcting rationale of voting. To argue that
"empty voting" is not a concern is to argue that there is no need for
shareholder voting at all. Before presenting our suggested response to
empty voting, we address two arguments that would remove the need
for a response: first, an economic based argument that vote buying
transactions produce overall gains for society, and second, that
disclosure can best address whatever problems arise because of empty
voting.
More than forty years ago, Henry Manne argued that allowing
the unrestricted trading of votes would benefit shareholders in the
same way that economic exchanges produce economic gains elsewhere
in the economy. 10 4 Similar arguments can be made in the MylanKing
transaction. If the Mylan/King transaction produces net gains on the
whole, apart from the distributional consequences for the shareholders
of the two companies, vote buying that facilitates this result can be a
positive for the economy. When the shareholder census consists of
diversified investors such as institutional shareholders, these
investors may well own shares in companies on both sides of the deal
and would prefer a transaction where their net investment increases
without regard to whether there is a larger gain on the target side and
a smaller loss on the acquirer side. Larry Ribstein and Bruce
Kobayashi have shown that vote buying in a Mylar/King scenario
103. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1072-77 (2007) (explaining that hedge funds are set
up to profit their investors, not shareholders generally); Kara Scannell, How Borrowed Shares
Swing Company Votes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2007, at Al (discussing a study by Henry Hu and
Bernard Black that finds a rise of "empty voting" by which hedge funds borrow shares and use
them to swing votes in their favor).
104. Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf
A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1428 (1964).
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prevents an undiversified shareholder, such as a Carl Icahn, from
standing in the way of a beneficial total gain.105
We find these economic justifications for empty voting
unconvincing for two reasons. The first is that, as we argued above,
the purpose of the vote is to act as error correction for directors and
management, with the goal of ensuring that the stock price of the
company will increase. It is not to facilitate transactions that lose
money for the shareholders but are part of a combined transaction
that is efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense of that term. If the goal of
the vote were to facilitate such transactions, there would be no reason
to limit the franchise to shareholders. Indeed, the pursuit of Kaldor-
Hicks efficient transactions would almost surely entail giving votes to
employees, bond holders, suppliers, and/or local government officials.
Corporate law has rejected that approach-voting occurs by
companies, not by transactions, and the franchise is limited to
shareholders because the law has decided that each corporation is best
served by focusing on its own stock price, not overall social welfare.
The second argument against using voting to justify an
outcome that is bad for shareholders but economically more efficient is
that this is exactly a situation in which the directors should be
disciplined by their shareholders. If the deal truly produces a
cooperative surplus, then the directors should have a responsibility to
capture some of that surplus for the shareholders. To cede all of that
surplus and more to the other party, leaving the shareholders in a
worse position than before, requires the sort of error correction that
corporate voting provides.
Many institutional shareholders already find themselves in a
position where they own shares in companies on both sides of a
merger. It is likely that many base their vote on the net effect of the
deal on their total holdings, a phenomenon that has not raised the
same concerns as empty voting. It is less worrisome because such
behavior does not create a systematic bias; the number of institutional
investors who are unbalanced in the direction of the target should
balance the number who are unbalanced in the direction of the bidder.
And all have an economic interest in both sides. While a vote buyer
can move the vote in the direction of a value-increasing transaction
just as the net institutional investors might, the separation of votes
from economic interest permits voting for an outcome in which there is
not an economic benefit, but only an effort to make money on one side.
105. Bruce H. Kobayayshi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 42-44 (2006).
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In the several years since empty voting was first identified,
academic commentary focused on disclosure. Marcel Kahan and
Edward Rock's innovative treatment of hedge funds and activist
investors was skeptical of a need for anything more than disclosure. 10 6
Hu and Black's first set of papers on empty voting focused on
transparency and disclosure.10 7 Their integrated disclosure proposal
suggests overhauling the principal federal disclosure requirements
under sections 13(d), 13(f), 13(g), and 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act and under mutual funds regulation to include relevant
information about equity swaps and other derivatives.108 Additional
disclosure requirements relating to hedges and derivatives have been
put in place in the last few years in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong,
and Switzerland. 10 9 In January 2008, a group of Europe's largest
hedge funds issued voluntary best-practice guidelines that could
prompt greater disclosure from the funds. 110
Why might one expect that increased disclosure would curb
empty voting? Disclosure's effect might arise from a combination of
several influences. Reflecting Brandeis's classic work from a century
ago that sunlight is the best disinfectant,"1 ' disclosure by itself might
cause some traders to eschew empty voting. It may also discourage the
required counterparties from participating in such transactions. In
addition, disclosure can provide necessary information for others in
the market to adapt and counter the actions of empty voters, thus
making the strategy less productive.
Disclosure, however, will not necessarily prevent the
counterparty from agreeing to an empty voting transaction. Each of
Perry's transactions had a counterparty, such as Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley, who may have had a conflicting interest to the empty
voter. There is also the possibility of another investor engaging in
similar transactions on the opposite side. In the MylanKing case, Carl
Icahn owned a large position in Mylan and was active in encouraging
a negative vote on the transaction by its shareholders. 112 Icahn
106. Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1077.
107. Hu & Black, supra note 3, at 819.
108. Hu & Black, supra note 100, at 682-84.
109. Id. at 684.
110. Cassell Bryan-Low, European Hedge Funds Issue Disclosure Guidelines, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 23, 2008, at C6.
111. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Nat'l
Home Library Found. 1933) (1913).
112. The deal ended for other reasons when King reported unexpected earnings changes. For
an overview of the Perry-Mylan Laboratories transaction, see Hu & Black, supra note 3, at 828-
29, and Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1075-76.
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apparently did not engage in vote buying, although he was said to
have taken a short position in King, enabling him to make money on
both sides of the deal should the transaction not be successful.
Even with complete and effective disclosure, however, there is
reason to doubt that the counterparties have sufficient economic
incentives to forgo a transaction that creates shares with empty
voting. Where the counterparty's transaction is motivated by share
lending or hedging unrelated to voting, the economic incentives from
those activities may drown out any incentives attributed to voting. To
the extent that lending shares and swaps are embedded within a large
and lucrative financial industry whose main purposes are unrelated to
vote buying, the marginal incentives provided by voting will likely be
insufficient to drive the transaction. In addition, the counterparty's
possible economic loss will be muted if the market has already
anticipated much of the economic impact of the acquisition for the
acquirer. 113 At the time of the swap transaction, the stock of the
acquirer likely will already have fallen, given the prior public
announcement of the takeover. Thus, the counterparty will not suffer
further loss and will have less incentive to counter a Perry-type
strategy. 1 4 Further, to the extent that traders like Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley are not using their own money, there is an
agency problem: the costs of the swap will not become visible to the
principal or the voting value can be buried within a larger trading
strategy.
Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy, who published the first
work on this issue, argued that encumbered shares, as they termed
shares whose economic interest has been hedged, should carry little or
no voting rights.115 Hu and Black have now gone beyond their initial
disclosure proposal and recommended a host of structural changes,
including letting corporations amend their charters to limit empty
voting, requiring attestation by large shareholders that their vote does
not exceed their economic interest by more than twenty percent,
113. J. FRED WESTON ET AL., TAKEOVERS, RESTRUCTURING, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
596 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that after the announcement of a merger, the stock price of the
target typically trades at a small discount of one to two percent 'relative to the consideration
offered by the acquirer).
114. There could be a loss to the extent that the current market price will reflect the
expected financial impact of the transaction on the acquirer, multiplied by the likelihood of the
deal going through. To the extent that the probability is less than one hundred percent, the
current price will only reflect a percentage of that decline. As the takeover moves toward
successful completion, the gap between the entire change and the market price will narrow, and
to that extent the counterparty on the acquirer side could face an additional loss.
115. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 787-804
(2005).
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barring voting with negative economic ownership, requiring
derivatives dealers holding matched shares to hedge a short equity
position held by an investor to pass through voting to counterparties,
providing a safe harbor to permit institutional investors to recall
shares without being subject to derivative suits for not lending,
allowing institutional lenders to recall lent shares, requiring record
owners to recall a number of shares sufficient to honor anticipated
voting instructions, limiting share loans by record owners, amending
state law to permit proportionate voting when there is over voting,
having voting agendas available before the record date, and
separating dividend and voting record dates. 116
The vast difference in size between the share lending
transactions and hedging in the global market and the much smaller
number of possible empty voting transactions means that for many of
these proposals, substantial costs will be imposed on the larger
business to address empty voting. We focus our proposed solution on a
less complicated suggestion that reflects the law's traditional concern
about alignment between economic and voting interest. We propose a
modern adaptation of the traditional corporate law bans on
agreements that separate voting from control and on vote buying.
As we have shown in Part III, voting in the corporate context
plays both an error-correcting and principal-agent monitoring role. To
play this role effectively, the voter's interest and the common good
must be aligned. Even where the scope of shareholder voting is
limited, the essential nature of the remaining role for voting has long
motivated legal efforts to prevent disrupting the alignment between
voting and financial interest. Such pro-alignment efforts include (1)
requiring one share/one vote, (2) banning agreements that separate
voting from financial interests in shares, and (3) banning vote buying.
We now survey the judicial response to each of these alignment
methods. 117
1. One Share/One Vote Requirements
The traditional requirement that every share have the same
vote is perhaps the clearest example of the law's concern for
separation between voting and financial interest in a public
116. Hu & Black, supra note 100, at 694-721.
117. In addition, there are other legal rules that reflect similar concerns. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c) (2008) (prohibiting voting shares owned by the corporation); id. § 144
(excluding votes by shareholders who are conflicted); In re Cox Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 879 A.2d
604, 614-18 (Del. Ch. 2005) (discussing provisions requiring a majority of the minority vote for
approval of a merger with a controlling shareholder).
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corporation. A voting system that gives some shareholders-for
example, the founding family or management-multiple votes per
share disconnects the decisionmaker's incentives from the financial
results of the decisions. The one share/one vote requirement, however,
is not found in any state or federal statute or regulation, 118 but rather
in the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange (and more
recently in parallel provisions in Nasdaq and other exchanges).11 9 The
original provision resulted from Populist efforts in the 1920s, spurred
by the arguments of a Harvard professor, at a time before there was
any federal corporate law and when the stock exchange had a greater
role in setting rules for corporate governance. 20 As a result, with rare
exceptions, such as when Ford Motor Company went public in 1956
and wanted to keep control within the Ford family, American public
companies exhibited a firm alignment between voting interest and
financial interest.' 2'
In the 1980s, in the face of a wave of hostile takeovers and a
swarm of defensive tactics that included an increased use of dual class
shares, the New York Stock Exchange began to worry about its
competitive position relative to other exchanges and pushed the SEC
to adopt a rule for all American public companies. 122 After a federal
appellate court struck down the agency's rule as beyond its power to
regulate on corporate governance, 123 the SEC pursued (and was
ultimately successful in) a lengthy effort to persuade the major
American exchanges to each implement a similar rule banning
midstream adoption of dual class voting structures. 124 Although eight
118. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (providing a rule of one vote per share "unless
otherwise provided" in the certificate).
119. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing stock exchange listing standards).
120. See Seligman, supra note 26, at 693-99 (summarizing William Ripley's criticism of
nonvoting common stock and its connection to the NYSE's initial refusal to list such stock).
121. See JOSEPH A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 166-77 (1958) (explaining
that when the Ford Motor Company went public, the shareholders were given Class A shares
with circumscribed voting power, making it extremely difficult to rally enough votes to oust the
Ford family).
122. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (2008).
123. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that Rule 19c-4
directly controls the substantive allocation of power among shareholders in excess of
commission's authority).
124. Current NYSE Listing Standard 313A prohibits corporate actions or issuance of shares
that disparately reduce or restrict voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded
companies registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, including the adoption of time
phased voting plans or the issuance of super voting stock or similar actions. NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL § 313A (2007). The actions by the stock exchanges, semi-private "self
regulatory organizations" under the 1934 Act, have not been held to be state action. See, e.g.,
Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999) (reiterating its
prior ruling "that the New York Stock Exchange-a self-regulatory private organization like the
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percent of American companies, including well-known firms like
Google, have dual class structures at the time they go public, one
share/one vote remains the standard for reasons that parallel the
vote/financial interest alignment discussed below. 125 The expectation
is that the founders and other selling shareholders in the initial public
offering will receive less money for the shares if the system is
inefficient. If these inefficiencies lead later to poor performance, those
companies remain vulnerable to economic pressure, as the New York
Times is now experiencing. 126 The recent takeover of the Dow Jones
Company, despite its dual class structure privileging its founding
families, shows the limits of these tactics. 127
2. Ban on Separating the Vote and the Financial Interest
It was a common feature of American corporate law at the turn
of the twentieth century to ban devices that separated the voting
interest of shares from the financial rights, like voting trusts, because
such a separation would disrupt the otherwise healthy result that
would flow from voting. 128 Early courts had a clear, though not
detailed, understanding of the importance of the alignment of
shareholder voting and financial interests. 129 Arrangements which
interfered with that alignment raised legal concerns.
The legal justification for interfering in what would normally
be considered a legitimate contract between private parties was often
framed as a public policy that each shareholder is entitled to rely on
an independent judgment of fellow shareholders. 130 Courts in the early
voting cases described this public policy as leading to a fiduciary duty
NASD-is not a state actor" (citing United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867-71 (2d Cir.
1975))).
125. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of
Dual-Class Companies in the United States 3 (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Research, Paper No.
12-04, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=562511.
126. Richard Perez-Pena, New Challenges to Times Board: Dissidents with Large Stakes,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at Cl; Emily Steel, Investor Puts Pressure on New York Times-
Nicely, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2008, at C3 (describing efforts of marketing professor who runs an
investment firm to pressure the company).
127. Mogul's Dream: News Corp.'s Success Follows Delicate Dance Between Suitor, Target,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2007, at Al.
128. See 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §
218.2 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2008-1) (explaining that the legality of voting
trusts at common law was not clearly determined by the Delaware courts until enactment of the
first voting trusts statutes.)
129. See, e.g., Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 807 (Del. 1966) (explaining that the main
purpose of the statute to legalize voting trusts was to avoid secret combination of shareholders
formed to acquire voting control to the possible detriment of non-participating shareholders).
130. E.g., Cone v. Russell, 21 A. 847, 848-50 (N.J. Ch. 1891).
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owed by all shareholders to one another, and that no shareholder by
contract could disable herself from performing that duty. 131 While
fiduciary duty today is usually limited to agents such as managers and
directors, who have the centralized power to make decisions for the
entity, or to controlling shareholders wielding similar power, courts
still extend a similar duty to individual non-majority holding
shareholders in close corporations in contexts where the shareholder's
vote gives her a veto over action beneficial for the corporation.132
These traditional bans on separation of voting from economic
interest have been relaxed in recent decades. In large part, this
reflects the realities of the close corporation contexts in which much of
the separation has occurred. An examination of those contexts is a
useful guide to the continuing applicability of these concepts in
contemporary public corporations.
When there were only a small number of shareholders, courts
were willing to permit voting agreements that facilitated an
aggregation of preferences and an implementation of majority rule.
The property interest of each shareholder provided a financial
commitment that aligned the voter's interests to at least the majority
of the shares. The small number meant that unlike in public
corporations, there was no collective action problem to overcome. In
these contexts, courts were willing to relax the traditionally restrictive
approach to contracts that appeared to separate voting and financial
interests of shares.
Legislatures and courts have increasingly permitted other
devices to accomplish a similar purpose. Irrevocable proxies are
authorized by statute so long as they are "coupled with an interest," a
phrase that means the person receiving the vote has a financial
interest of some sort in the shares, even if not necessarily a
proportional one. 33 Voting trusts putting voting power of a group of
shares into the hands of a trustee are permitted by statute, but often
subject to a time limit and disclosure. 34 Shareholder pooling
agreements are permitted by statute or case law. 135
131.E.g., Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (citing
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)).
132. E.g., Atlantic Properties, 422 N.E.2d at 801-04.
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(e) (2008).
134. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.30 (2008) (providing for a ten-year limit on voting
trusts with a provision for renewal).
135. See, e.g., id. § 7.31 (permitting an agreement amongst shareholders as to how to vote
their shares); id. § 7.32 (permitting agreements covering a variety of governance issues including
management, distributions, share transfers and dissolution, all valid for ten years unless the
agreement provides otherwise).
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This legislative and judicial easing of the earlier requirement of
alignment of voting and financial interests has occurred within close
corporations where the lack of a market for shares and the intimate
nature of the relationship broadened the need for private contracts
that temper the usual corporate norms of majority control and entity
permanence. 136 This easing does not reflect a view that voting without
financial interests is not a concern.
3. Bans on Vote Buying
A third traditional legal effort to control actions that break the
connection between voting and financial interest is the ban on vote
buying. Vote buying is prohibited by statutes in some states 137 and by
common law in others.138 The rationale is similar to that described
above: distortion arises when voting rights are placed in the hands of
one who lacks an economic interest in the business. Easterbrook and
Fischel argue that separation of shares from votes introduces a
disproportion between expenditures and rewards for those who make
decisions for the corporation, which results in inefficiency similar to
what can occur with dual class voting.139 Other arguments reflect a
concern for misrepresentation and fraud.
An additional dimension is that vote buying is sometimes seen
as helping overcome defensive tactics instituted by entrenched
management resisting a takeover that would be profitable for
shareholders of a target company. 140 When the directors of a target
implement takeover defenses, the acquirer must often try to unseat
the board. Vote buying may overcome various collective action
problems among the shareholders. The underlying assumption is that
136. See, e.g., id. § 7.32 (authorizing a variety of shareholder control agreements). Similar
provisions exist in a majority of American states.
137. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 609(e) (McKinney 2003) (prohibiting shareholders from
selling their votes or proxies to vote).
138. See, e.g., Macht v. Merchs. Mortgage & Credit Co., 194 A. 19, 22 (Del. Ch. 1937) (holding
that allowing purchased voting rights to be exercised violates public policy and defrauds other
shareholders).
139. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 74 (arguing that attaching the votes firmly
to the residual equity interests ensures that unnecessary agency costs will not occur).
140. Thomas J. Andre, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in the
Market for Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 533, 587 (1990).
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the takeover is in the interest of the shareholders 141 and that the vote
purchasers will vote in such a way as to maximize stock price. 142
But as we have seen in the Perry/Mylan case, there is no
guarantee that a non-shareholder has the interest to serve such a
function, and we have also seen that non-shareholders sometimes
have incentives to promote errors on the part of directors. 143 These
situations tend to occur when the vote is by the shareholders of an
acquiring company in a merger. Typically, these votes are required not
by state law but by the regulations of the listing stock exchange. 144
Based on the analysis in Part III, the argument against vote
buying in the corporate context is more compelling than the argument
against vote buying in the political context. In our analysis, corporate
voting is designed to correct errors by directors that lead to a decrease
in the value of the stock of the corporation. Shareholders are the
constituency with the best incentive to perform this task.4 5 The
argument against vote buying in the political context is more
problematic because there is no objective measure of "right." Given the
large number of constituencies and interests, voting can only
aggregate preferences, and there is little reason to prefer one person's
preferences over another's. Democracy, in fact, eschews exactly these
sorts of distinctions. Thus, if one voter does not care if his preferences
are considered, or is willing to pass on the costs of voting to someone
with similar preferences for a fee, it is not obvious from an aggregated
preferences or information perspective why vote buying is wrong.
This is not to say, of course, that there are not good reasons to
limit vote buying in the political context that also apply to shareholder
voting. Richard Hasen's work on vote buying defines an inalienability
141. Levmore, supra note 28, at 137-38 (suggesting that states have begun to allow vote
buying as "a useful safety valve where defensive tactics go too far in blocking desirable
takeovers").
142. Andre, supra note 140, at 587 ("Additionally, the permanent separation of ownership
and control is unlikely to occur because the purchaser has every incentive to purchase the
residual interests."); Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1354 (2000) ("Thus,
we need not worry, to paraphrase Sunstein, that shareholders will forget what voting in
corporate elections is for; voting in corporate elections is for maximizing profit, and vote buying
is fully consistent with this purpose.").
143. Another instance in which the shareholders of the acquirer had an incentive to vote in a
way contrary to the financial interest of the company was a transaction involving AXA and
MONY. In re MONY Group Inc. S'holders Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 667-70 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also
Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1073-74 (using the MONY and AXA merger to illustrate how the
interests of hedge funds diverge from those of their fellow shareholders).
144. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing stock exchange listing standards).
145. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (describing the importance of the stock price
as a measure of board performance).
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purpose, treating voting as belonging to the community as a whole. 146
Cass Sunstein develops an anti-commodification norm to encourage
more public-regarding votes and less voting in individual self-
interest. 147 Another approach analogizes vote selling to a restraint of
trade that interferes with the market and would be banned by
antitrust law. Samuel Issacharoffs concern for the vulnerability that
the political marketplace shares with all other markets resonates
here-there is a "possibility that anti-competitive behavior will
compromise the ability of selection to reveal true consumer
preferences."'148 These arguments against vote buying in the political
context may further buttress the argument in the corporate sphere.
The most widely cited modern case on corporate vote buying,
the 1982 Delaware decision in Schreiber v. Carney, provides a
somewhat bewildering treatment of the topic. The court refused to find
that vote buying was per se illegal. It declined to define impermissible
vote buying by reference to earlier public policy that these
transactions frustrated the shareholder's exercise of his personal
judgment.149 The court refused to apply a per se rule to an agreement
that it found "was entered into primarily to further the interests of
[the corporation's] other shareholders."150 Yet the court held that vote
buying, even for some laudable purpose, still is "so easily susceptible
of abuse" that it must be viewed as a voidable transaction subject to a
test for intrinsic fairness. 151
In the wake of Schreiber, many commentators saw the law as
having pulled back from substantive regulation of vote buying and
similar constraints that limited separation of voting and economic
interest. 152 The case law does not seem to support such a broad
conclusion. Schreiber occurred in a context where the asserted
146. Hasen, supra note 142, at 1327-38 (describing equality, efficiency, and inalienability
reasons to ban vote buying).
147. Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 785-
90 (1994).
148. Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 616.
149. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25 (Del. Ch. 1982) ("[T]he potential injury or
prejudicial impact that might flow to other stockholders as a result of such an agreement forms
the heart of the rationale underlying the breach of public policy doctrine.").
150. Id.
151. Id. at 26.
152. Hasen, supra note 142, at 1348-49; Levmore, supra note 28, at 138 (adopting "the
current wisdom that vote buying in corporate law is now more acceptable than it once was and
that we are soon likely to see more explicit legislative and judicial approval of trading in
shareholder voting rights"); see also Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 776, 806-07 (1979) (arguing that vote buying should be permitted if the
purchaser has a substantial equity interest and seeks to profit solely by the change in the value
of that holding).
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agreement was fully disclosed and approved by disinterested
shareholders. Moreover, the vote buying agreement was a means to
better align the financial interests of the shareholder with that of the
corporation.
In fact, an analysis of Schreiber and similar cases indicates
that courts will allow vote buying only when such a deal aligns the
financial interests of the shareholders with those of the corporation. 153
Similarly, there is little reason to apply a vote buying prohibition
where the challenged conduct provides proxy votes during the period
that the party has agreed to dispose of stock as part of a settlement of
a failed proxy contest.154 Nor should there be concern for the failure to
apply a vote buying ban to close corporations where, as already
discussed, the shareholders are perfectly capable of evaluating
whether the incentives of their fellow shareholders create a conflicted
economic incentive against the good of the corporation. 155
As we have just shown, courts have traditionally policed
attempts to separate the financial and voting interest of stocks. Our
proposed response requires that courts extend this concern to the
arena of empty voting. The core legal principle that will need to be
153. See IXC Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc., No. C.A. 17324, C.A. 17334, 1999 WL
1009174, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (allowing vote buying agreement in which shareholders
agreed to support merger in exchange for cash because the deal was adequately disclosed and an
independent majority of shareholders (owning nearly sixty percent of all IXC shares) could
determine the outcome of the merger); see also Kass v. E. Air Lines, 1986 WL 13008, at *2-5
(Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986) (mem. opinion) (restructuring required vote of debenture holders and the
company offered cash/vouchers if they would agree to the amendments; vote buying allowed
because each holder had an economic incentive to evaluate whether any threat to the value of
bonds posed by the amendment was more or less valuable than the consideration offered for his
consent, and he could accept or reject in accordance with this decision).
154. Weinberger v. Bankston, 1987 WL 20182, at *1, *4-5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 1987) (mem.
opinion) (settling a failed proxy contest; insurgents took fees and agreed to dispose of stock
within a year, giving management irrevocable proxy in the meantime). The closest example
among recent cases of a situation involving potential conflict of incentive between the holders of
the votes and economic interest is Wincorp Realty Invs., Inc. v. Goodtab, Inc., No. 7314, 1983 WL
8948, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1983) (involving an insurgent that bought option for $20,000 with
$17,000 kicker if buyer was successfully elected). The application for a preliminary injunction of
the voting of the shares was denied because the plaintiff failed to show an irreparable injury if
the shares were voted and, under Schreiber, such vote buying was not illegal per se. Id. at *5-6.
Moreover, the plaintiff failed to put on the record any evidence of a breach of good faith in the
transaction. Id. at *5. It is also worth noting that the court distinguished Schreiber from the case
at hand in two ways: Schreiber "was an agreement between the corporation... and a
shareholder, the propriety of which was submitted to the other shareholders for approval," and it
was "an agreement whereby one shareholder agreed to withdraw its opposition to a plan of
management in return for a consideration given by the corporation." Id.
155. See, e.g., Haft v. Haft, 671 A.2d 413, 415-16, 421-23 (Del. Ch. 1995) (holding that,
where a family controlled a majority of shares of a public corporation and entered into an
agreement, the father could give shares to his son and receive in return an irrevocable proxy, as
this would not affect any decision by public shareholders).
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clarified, either by statute or common law, is a current manifestation
of the traditional rule that voting requires a basic alignment with the
collective interest. Contracts that are in disregard of that principle can
be voided. Requiring shareholders to certify that they are voting no
more shares than they have economic interests in would be a helpful
change and would advance the revised legal rule banning vote buying
and separation of ownership and control of the vote. Just as we
require some identification of voters in the public sector (recognizing
the considerable controversy over the degree of identification that can
be required 156), there is a need for some parallel verification not of the
person of the voter, but of the economic interest. Where abuse is
alleged, examination can occur, as it did in the Hewlett-Packard
case. 157 Delaware law already makes use of certification in corporate
voting; section 103 permits short form mergers when one shareholder
owns more than ninety percent of the shares. 158 A shareholder
establishes the right to use the more favorable short form procedures
by producing certification that the proportion of owned shares is more
than ninety percent.1 59 If there is a question about the validity of the
certification, it can be tested in subsequent litigation. Empty voting
broadens the search beyond management's voting; keeping the focus
on voters without economic interest is likely to be a more effective way
to police this conduct.
B. What Shareholders Vote On
The prior Subpart describes how our theory of corporate voting
leads to an effective response to empty voting. This Subpart turns to
the implications of our theory for determining which issues are
appropriate for a shareholder vote. Given the corporate governance
system described in Part III, we come to four core conclusions about
the subjects on which shareholders should vote. We advocate in favor
of increased shareholder voice in both removal of directors and in
approving mergers. On the other hand, we see less reason to extend
156. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (upholding the
constitutionality of an Indiana law requiring citizens voting in person to present a government-
issued photo identification).
157. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CIV.A. 19513-NC, 2002 WL 818091, at *12-15
(Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2002) (finding in favor of Hewlett-Packard on vote buying claims brought as a
challenge to the vote by Hewlett-Packard shareholders to approve a merger with Compaq).
158. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 103 (2008).
159. See id. § 253 (providing that for short form mergers, planners are able to skip the
shareholder voting step as part of the merger process).
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that voice to either board nomination or precatory votes. We will deal
with each of these conclusions in turn.
First, shareholders need to have an unfettered ability to
replace directors when there is a contested election. This often will
occur when managers have rebuffed a takeover, so we may assume
that the shareholders will be motivated by a potential change in the
stock price. If shareholder voting is to mean anything, it should at
least be required when directors and managers are conflicted and are
using their gatekeeper position to block a takeover that shareholders
believe is advantageous. There is always the possibility that
shareholders themselves are not free of self-interested motivations,
but without this ability to replace directors, shareholder voting will
serve no consistent, identifiable function. This is the one place where
Delaware courts have most sought to preserve shareholder voting and
its error-correcting function. Delaware courts are most vigilant in
preventing directors from changing the rules on the cusp of an election
that insiders seem destined to lose. 160 They give directors a bit more
freedom to make ministerial decisions about the time of the meeting
but still keep these decisions on a rather short leash.161
We depart from Delaware in proposing that the right to remove
directors also ought to include a direct means to remove the poison pill
and the staggered board without the board's approval.1 62 This flows
from our belief in the core importance of the removal power to
shareholder voting. Shareholder ability to replace the board can occur
either through voting out the board or selling into a tender offer from
a bidder who seeks to acquire a majority of the shares. A board
seeking to protect itself from such adverse actions must close off those
two avenues. Poison pills effectively preclude the route of shareholder
selling by making a hostile tender offer economically
disadvantageous.1 63 Staggered boards do a somewhat less complete job
160. See, e.g., Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1207, 1208-09 (Del. Ch. 1987) (blocking
board's postponement of the annual meeting on the eve of the scheduled meeting when
dissidents appeared to have a majority of proxies in hand); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.,
230 A.2d 769, 777 (Del. Ch. 1967) (blocking corporation's issuance of additional fifteen percent of
its shares immediately after a hostile bidder had acquired fifty-one percent of shares in a tender
offer).
161. See, e.g., Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990) (permitting
board delay in calling an annual meeting whose date had not yet been set).
162. Recall that the board has a gatekeeper position to block an amendment to the
corporation's articles of incorporation and that courts have permitted it to effectively refuse to
redeem a poison pill. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
163. William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The illusory Protections of the Poison Pill,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 186-97 (2003) (providing a numerical example of the dilution of a
poison pill).
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of shutting down shareholder voting by requiring two successful
director election victories before an insurgent can get control of the
board. Both defenses are in place in a majority of American public
corporations. 164
The antidote to a poison pill has become an election to replace
the board, which will then use the redemption power built into the
pill.165 Ostensibly, one election would be sufficient to replace the board
and to get the new members to redeem the poison pill. But when a
staggered board is also in place, the poison pill cannot be removed for
two annual meetings. Consequently, shareholder replacement of the
board will be put off until at least that time. Because staggered board
provisions are part of the firm's articles of incorporation, for which the
board has a gatekeeper position, the provisions cannot be removed
without the board's consent until there have been back-to-back
successful election campaigns to gain a board majority. 166
To the extent that the motivation for such electoral campaigns
derives from the economic incentive of a bidder who is willing to buy
the shares for a premium, this combination of poison pills and
staggered boards means that non-friendly efforts are likely to succeed
only when a bidder is willing to commit sufficient resources (and the
economy is suitable for making such a commitment) over two annual
meetings, which could stretch between thirteen to thirty months or
longer. 167
Should shareholders be able to do in one step, via direct
initiative of an amendment to the articles, what would take multiple
steps over a much longer period? Or put another way, how much
should directors be able to slow down shareholder efforts to remove
them? The argument against quick shareholder action is likely to be
that shareholders are motivated by a desire for a quick profit at the
expense of other constituents whose contracts do not fully protect
164. See SharkRepellant.net, www.sharkrepellant.net (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (reporting
that 803 of the S&P 1500 had a classified board as of year-end, down from 902 at year-end 1998).
See generally Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
149 (2008) (stating that the majority of U.S. publicly traded companies have charter-based
staggered boards).
165. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) (discussing board's
obligation to consider redemption and effectively insuring that all poison pills would include the
redemption feature included in the initial pill that secured judicial approval).
166. This assumes that shareholders are unable to call a special meeting or act by written
consent as is true in most public corporations. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
167. Shareholders cannot get a court to order a shareholders' meeting unless no meeting
date has been designated and thirteen months have passed since the last annual meeting. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2008); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.03(a)(1) (2008) (requiring that
fifteen months have passed since the last annual meeting).
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against such expropriation. That is, the stock price may not act as a
proxy for the overall health of the company, so the shareholders may
not be acting as effective monitors of the directors. Instead,
shareholders may be abusing their oversight role for their own private
benefit. Directors, who normally have the power to act for the
collective, would argue for the power to protect against such selfish
shareholder actions.168 Thus, whether shareholders should have the
power to unilaterally dismantle a poison pill involves a tradeoff
between the likelihood of the board's selfish behavior and the
likelihood of shareholders' selfish behavior. The possible externalizing
behavior of shareholders may justify permitting the board to slow
down shareholder action, but, in our view, the greater need to monitor
directors and managers ought to trump that risk.
Even with such a change, shareholder votes would be well
short of instant plebiscites, so the board will not lack time to develop
alternative proposals that could provide a better deal for the entity.
Most public companies have a staggered board, thus even a direct
initiative to change the articles without the board's blocking power
would be a two step process in which the shareholders agree to change
the articles and then use their annual meeting to replace the entire
board. If shareholders choose to remove a staggered board before a
real takeover threat actually exists, they would shorten the time
necessary to remove the board once a takeover has appeared. Other
company constituents would be on notice of such a change and could
adjust their own contracts and behavior.
There has been a notable surge in the last three years in the
willingness of many public companies to remove staggered boards
from their charters in the face of aggressive institutional investor
pressure.169 Any further change toward permitting shareholders an
168. Cf. City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988) (explaining
that "an active negotiator with power, in effect, to refuse the proposal may be able to extract a
higher or otherwise more valuable proposal, or may be able to arrange an alternative transaction
or a modified business plan that will present a more valuable option to shareholders").
169. Data on shareholder voting for 2007 from SharkRepellent.net shows ninety-seven
shareholder votes on removing classified boards. Almost two-thirds (fifty-two plus six additional
that were pending as of the reporting date) were management proposals such that they would be
binding actions to amend the corporation's articles, and many of these followed shareholder
proposals at prior meetings that had acquired a majority or substantial minority of precatory
votes from shareholders. About two dozen of the proposals were shareholder precatory proposals
that received more than fifty percent of the vote but had not lead to any management action to
amend the articles. In another dozen the precatory shareholder proposal received less than a
fifty percent shareholder vote. There were five other votes in which the results remained
uncertain. This is a much higher number of binding classified board amendments than in any
prior year and reflects director response to prior shareholder precatory proposals receiving a
majority vote. See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 854 (reporting a high of eleven repeals of staggered
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immediate lever would require amending state corporate law to
permit shareholders to initiate a binding change in the articles of
incorporation without the board having its current blocking position.
Given the increased willingness of directors to respond to institutional
shareholder pressure, the time may have come for Delaware to
consider such a change, which would reflect the error-correction
function of shareholder voting.
Second, shareholders should retain their existing right to
approve mergers and similar transactions that have been approved by
directors, but with the obvious loopholes closed. The separate
shareholder vote on these transactions ensures that director self-
interest will not supersede the corporation's interest when the
directors are in their final period on the target side or empire building
on the acquirer side. 170 If this limit is to have any consistent meaning,
it would seem necessary to extend the shareholder vote to financially
equivalent transactions that accomplish the same economic result. As
discussed earlier, this would include triangular mergers and
acquisitions of assets. 17'
The current statutory scheme is a hodgepodge that does not
reflect the purpose for shareholder voting. Much of this can be laid at
the feet of the Delaware doctrine of "independent legal significance,"
which in turn, can be attributed to an effort to spare corporations the
costs of having to provide shareholders the liquidity in arm's length
mergers required by the appraisal statutes.' 72 Hariton v. Arco
Electronics, the case that applied this doctrine, provides an
example. 73 There actually was a shareholder vote in Hariton, but the
opponents on the target side desired appraisal rights, which were not
provided in a sale of assets. 174 Appraisal serves less of a function today
in arm's length deals, but voting continues to have its traditional
boards after a majority vote on a precatory shareholder proposal in the years through 2003);
Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium:
Shareholder Support, Board Response and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 377 (2007)
(reporting that the percentage of times that directors took action in response to corporate
governance proposals that received a majority of the shareholder vote increased from 15.49% in
2002 to 50.42% in 2004).
170. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting the disagreement between stock
exchange listing standards and state law standards requiring shareholder voting).
171. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing triangular mergers).
172. See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 244-50 (1962) (explaining the development of the corporation as an
independent legal entity and the effects of this status on mergers).
173. 188 A.2d 123, 124 (Del. 1963) (involving a shareholder vote in which eighty percent of
the target company shareholders approved the plan and the voluntary dissolution).
174. Id.
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function. Other de facto merger cases reflect a need to avoid appraisal
rights on the acquirer side, even when there is a vote. 175
At this point, separating the voting purpose of shareholder
participation in merger decisions and the liquidity function provided
by appraisal likely requires legislative action in Delaware to overturn
the independent legal significance doctrine. Decoupling voting and
exit would contribute toward a more meaningful and consistent
understanding of shareholder voting and exit.
At the same time, such legislative action should also establish
voting equivalency for similar kinds of financial transactions involving
substantially equivalent economic combinations. This means that
state law should extend shareholder participation to triangular
mergers from which shareholders are presently excluded because of
the introduction of a wholly owned subsidiary in place of the parent
company on the acquirer side of the transaction. The stock exchange
rules currently cover this, but the stock exchanges are not likely to
continue to provide rules of corporate governance. Creating a
comprehensive rule within state law is likely the only practical route
to consistency. 176 More importantly, state law should also cover
acquisitions of assets by which a company substantially changes its
size, as happened to Time in the Time/Warner acquisition. 177
Part of the dilemma here is that shareholder voting is required
under the traditional merger statutes for a change as small as a
twenty percent increase in the outstanding stock of the issuer. That
requirement is a holdover from the vestigial merger provisions in
which statutes moved from requiring unanimity to a supermajority for
shareholder approval and offered shareholders voting and appraisal
rights as a substitute for their veto. That twenty percent threshold is
likely too low to necessitate shareholder monitoring given other
constraints on directors, and it would be appropriate to move this
number to one hundred percent. The Model Business Corporations Act
175. See Terry v. Penn Cent. Corp., 668 F.2d 188, 189-92 (3d Cir. 1981) (involving a
triangular merger in which shareholders of the parent of the acquiring corporation voted but
were denied appraisal rights because only the subsidiary was a participant in the merger).
176. See Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism and the Administrative State: The SEC's
Discretion to Move the Line Between the State and Federal Realms of Corporate Governance, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1174-85 (2007) (describing the changing economic structure of stock
markets and the likelihood of reduced governance listing standards from the exchanges).
177. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Current corporations statutes distinguish
between the sale of substantially all of a corporation's assets and the purchase of large amounts
of assets.
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has moved substantially in this direction, but its changes have yet to
be enacted in a significant number of states.178
Third, while voting is effective in these two decisional settings,
shareholder nominations for directors are not nearly as important.
Recent SEC efforts to broaden shareholders' ability to nominate
directors 179 and to make recommendations regarding the election
process to permit shareholder nominations are attempts to address
second order problems.180 In part, the nomination process is less suited
to a collective action vote than the election process itself, which has a
more definitive and often a bimodal choice. In the nomination process,
shareholder action cannot effectively match the actions of the smaller
group of better informed directors in an uncontested election where
there is no obvious director self-interest. For a dispersed group of
shareholders in an uncontested election, the incentives to gather
information may be insufficient to offset the costs of the search. It is
also far from clear that the stock price is sensitive to the nomination of
directors. The nomination process does not as easily permit
shareholders to perform the error-correcting function they carry out in
the contested election or removal of directors.
More generally, this reflects a larger point that the shareholder
election process in the initial and uncontested election of directors is
not nearly as important to the purpose of shareholder voting as the
ability to remove directors in a contested election. If it is
acknowledged that shareholder voting does not arise from a plenary
shareholder power to fill all gaps but rather performs a more specified
error-correction function where director decisionmaking is particularly
questionable, the initial election process in an uncontested setting
does not go to the core purpose of voting.
Finally, the precatory voting system that has grown up under
federal proxy law presents a mixed bag in terms of its fit as part of a
consistent theory of shareholder voting. For most of Rule 14a-8's seven
178. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04 (2008) (providing that the vote of shareholders of the
acquiring corporation is not required for issuance of shares unless required by id. § 6.21(f), which
requires a shareholder vote only if new shares to be issued total more than the existing number
of outstanding shares).
179. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626, 68 Fed.
Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 14, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
180. Id. (proposing a rule that would require public companies to provide a mechanism for
nominees of long-term security holders with significant holdings to be included in company proxy
materials where evidence suggested companies had been unresponsive to shareholder opinions in
the 14a-8 process); see also INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., 2006 POSTSEASON REPORT 16
(2006). For another reason to think that access to the nomination process is of secondary
importance, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power:
Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 475 (2008).
[Vol. 62:1:129
CORPORATE VOTING
decades of existence, shareholder proposals related to general social
issues on which some shareholders had intense feelings, but overall
the issues were in the core area of decisions that corporate law trusts
directors to make.181 Absent a belief that shareholders should make
the residual decisions about what products to produce and which
plants to close, shareholder voting on these issues contributes little to
getting a more accurate answer. Indeed, few such provisions achieve a
majority vote from shareholders, and the particular corporation's
actions are often tangential to the issues. In the same way that we
suggested above that shareholder voting on mergers is done on a
company by company basis and not on whether the transaction as a
whole is a positive net benefit, there is less reason to encourage
shareholder voting on issues where the interests of the particular
company are not central and where the directors have no obvious
disability that prevents them from making a decision.
Over the last decade or two, there has been a notable shift in
Rule 14a-8 proposals with many more of them now addressing
internal corporate governance, usually in an effort to shift the
allocation of power in the direction of shareholders. When these
proposals ask shareholders to vote on article amendments to repeal a
staggered board or to block a poison pill, they fit within our second
conclusion above and are consistent with the theory of shareholder
voting that we develop here. When the proposals go beyond these
questions to cover questions such as cumulative voting, separating the
positiQns of board chair and chief executive officer, and withholding
votes, they fall further from the error-correcting purpose of
shareholder voting. Since shareholder action on all of these issues will
have no operative effect, and given that all of the decisions are within
the plenary powers of directors running the corporation, it is more
difficult for these votes to effectuate error reduction. These votes can
be supported, if at all, as an early-warning system to alert directors to
what the shareholders perceive as a potential error. If the issues are
ones on which the directors have a conflict or another disability, a
shareholder vote may increase the likelihood of getting the correct
answer. This error correction is likely to work in a more subdued
manner, folded within the director decisionmaking process and
various inputs that operate there. But even here, our theory of voting
tells us something about the purpose sought to be achieved. It is an
early warning corrective to director error, not an exercise of plenary
power by the shareholders.
181. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Shareholder voting differs from public voting in that the shares
on which the vote depends can be bought and sold. This necessarily
reflects a choice to take advantage of the economic incentives that will
influence such decisionmaking and the markets that facilitate this
choice. But it has also obscured any principled justification as to why
parties cannot take their economic exchanges further and buy votes,
not just shares. The financial innovations of recent years facilitate the
trader's ability to buy and sell any combination of rights, including
voting rights separated from the financial interests of shares. This
financial innovation has occurred against a backdrop of legal
developments in the second half of the twentieth century that relaxed
longstanding judicial restrictions on vote buying and arrangements to
separate voting from the financial interests of shares.
The effect of these developments has been to undermine the
role of voting in corporate governance and obfuscate any theory to
describe the purposes of shareholder voting. Nor does a consistent
theory emerge when we look at those questions on which shareholders
vote. There are intense arguments about the need for a greater use of
the shareholder franchise or for management discretion, but these
arguments tend to omit any discussion about the purpose we want
voting to serve. In this Article we seek to develop a theory of voting
based on error correction. That theory, in turn, tells us the decisions in
which we want shareholders to participate and the characteristics
that need to be maintained for the vote. Our theory does not put
shareholder voting in a plenary position, deciding all residual
questions. Rather, we take as a starting point the corporate structure
that puts all corporate decisions in the board of directors and confines
shareholders to voting on two specified sets of questions. This
structure reflects those questions where shareholder participation is
most useful and defines those sub-issues on which we should focus.
Other functions linked to the shareholder franchise, such as
shareholder nominations or precatory votes on matters of social
importance, do not fit as well with this theory of corporate voting.
A decisionmaking system that relies on votes to determine the
decision of the group necessarily requires that the voters' interest be
aligned with the collective interest. It remains important to require an
alignment between share voting and the financial interest of the
shares. Some of the traditional justifications against alignment, such
as in close corporations contexts, are less salient in empty voting
contexts, where there remains a need to foster the traditional
[Vol. 62:1:129
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alignment between voting and financial interests of shares. We
provide the outlines here of an ex post solution, using courts, that
takes advantage of economic incentives to prevent empty voting.

